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The Privacy Hierarchy: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Intimate Privacy  
Protection Act vs. the Geolocational  
Privacy and Surveillance Act 
KATHERINE A. MITCHELL* 
The advent of the technological boom brought the world 
smartphones, social media, and Siri. These novel benefits, 
however, were accompanied by unchartered invasions of 
privacy. Congress has embarked on the seemingly endless 
path of protecting its constituents through civil and criminal 
legislation aimed at combatting such invasions. Two recent 
examples include the Intimate Privacy Protection Act 
(“IPPA”) and the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance 
Act (“GPS Act”). Nonetheless, the IPPA, which was pro-
posed to criminalize the dissemination of nonconsensual 
pornography, has garnered much less support—and much 
more criticism—than its geolocational counterpart. 
This Note discusses the striking similarities of both bills, 
both practically and elementally. The criminality of both 
bills turns on the issue of contextual consent. Why then do 
we see such discrepancies in support? The answer may lie 
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in both legal and societal justifications behind privacy pro-
tections, suggesting that some forms of privacy warrant 
more protections than others. Hence, the privacy hierarchy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The right to privacy has been considered a long-held substantive 
right since the founding of our nation.1 Which categories of privacy 
are considered protected by this right, however, is a debate that has 
existed nearly as long.2 Determining what constitutes federally pro-
tected privacy has often been shaped by the surrounding geopolitical 
and social climates of the era of enactment.3 The technological par-
oxysm of the past few decades has resulted in an emergence of new 
                                                                                                         
 1  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 484–46 (1965) (ruling for the first time that the Constitution, through 
the Bill of Rights, implies a fundamental right to privacy). 
 2  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–86. 
 3  See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding as constitu-
tional a Georgia anti-sodomy criminal law), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
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and advanced invasions of privacy—both beneficial and unset-
tling—and, with that, a newly kindled need for potential privacy 
laws.4 
Currently, there are two federal bills under congressional review 
that, if enacted, will each federally criminalize the intentional dis-
closure of an individual’s private information without that individ-
ual’s consent, with limited exceptions. The Intimate Privacy Protec-
tion Act (“IPPA”) was introduced as a way to combat the relatively 
recent phenomenon of “revenge porn,”5 or the dissemination of a 
sexually explicit image or video of a personally identifiable individ-
ual without that individual’s consent.6 Comparably, the Geoloca-
tional Privacy and Surveillance (“GPS”) Act, aside from providing 
clarity regarding procedures required by law enforcement to track 
an individual’s whereabouts, also prohibits the disclosure or dissem-
ination of an individual’s geolocation information or data without 
that individual’s consent.7 In essence, both bills were introduced in 
response to unsettling privacy attacks in wake of the digital age. 
                                                                                                         
U.S. 558, 576–79 (2003) (holding anti-sodomy criminal laws unconstitutional as 
a violation of one’s right to privacy).  
 4  See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding war-
rantless search and seizures of cell phone records revealing location information 
violates the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (drug-
detecting dog sniff on front porch of a home found violative of Fourth Amend-
ment); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (installation of a GPS tracking 
device on defendant’s vehicle constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth 
Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (warrantless use of ther-
mal imaging device to measure heat emanating from home is unlawful). 
 5  See infra Part I.  
 6  Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. (2016). 
Note that the IPPA has recently been repackaged as the “ENOUGH Act,” or the 
“Ending Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment Act of 2017.” See S. 
2162, 115th Cong. (2017). Nonetheless, both bills are proposed “to provide that 
it is unlawful to knowingly distribute a private, visual depiction of a person’s in-
timate parts or of a person engaging in sexually explicit conduct, with reckless 
disregard for the person’s lack of consent to the distribution, and for other pur-
poses.” H.R. 5896; S. 2162 (using “individual” in place of “person”). Despite cer-
tain differences, the crux of both versions is the same for purposes of this Note, 
which will refer to the IPPA. 
 7  Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 1062, 115th Cong. 
(2017). Many sources cited throughout this Note discuss or analyze the 2013 ver-
sion of the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 1312, 113th Cong. 
(2013). Nonetheless, the proposed bills are identical and the analyses remain the 
same. Note, however, that the Senate version of the Act, though largely identical 
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Both bills garnered bipartisan support;8 however, the IPPA, and 
many of its state counterparts, faced seemingly surprising backlash 
and opposition from considerable legal organizations, such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”),9  while the GPS Act 
gained the support of not only the ACLU, but other tech industry 
leaders as well.10 In her article, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View 
from the Front Lines, Professor Mary Anne Franks highlights these 
seeming contradictions, thus providing the genesis of the privacy 
disparity question.11  
This Note conducts a comparative analysis of each bill and their 
respective critiques in an attempt to gauge how these discrepancies 
materialized. Part I provides a brief overview of the prevalence and 
effects of revenge porn, discussing the need for its criminalization. 
                                                                                                         
and introduced on the exact same day, contains slight differences. See Geoloca-
tional Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 395, 115th Cong. (2017). For ease, this 
Note will only refer to the House version. 
 8  Mary Anne Franks, It’s Time for Congress to Protect Intimate Privacy, 
HUFFPOST (July 18, 2016, 1:32 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-
anne-franks/revenge-porn-intimate-privacy-protection-act_b_11034998.html 
[hereinafter Franks, It’s Time]; Rahul Kapoor & Christopher C. Archer, Geoloca-
tion Privacy and Surveillance Act Introduced in US Congress, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/geolocation-privacy-and-
surveillance-act-introduced-us-congress.  
 9  Franks, It’s Time, supra note 8; see also Free Speech and Media Groups 
Applaud Governor’s Veto of Overbroad “Revenge Porn” Bill, ACLU (June 21, 
2016), www.aclu.org/news/free-speech-and-media-groups-applaud-governors-
veto-overbroad-revenge-porn-bill (collecting support for the governor’s veto of a 
similar state bill combatting nonconsensual pornography). 
 10  See Sandra Fulton, Congress Must Act to Stop Unwarranted Tracking by 
Law Enforcement, ACLU (Mar. 22, 2013, 10:22 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/congress-must-act-stop-unwarranted-
tracking-law; cf. ACLU and Bipartisan Supporters Urge Passage of Bill to Check 
GPS Tracking by Police: It’s Time to Bring Privacy Laws up to Speed with New 
Technology, ACLU (Mar. 20, 2013), www.aclu.org/news/aclu-and-bipartisan-
supporters-urge-passage-bill-check-gps-tracking-police (urging the passage of a 
bill similar to the GPS Act in Maine).  
 11  Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 
69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1333–35 (2017) [hereinafter Franks, “Revenge Porn” Re-
form]. As a pioneer of nonconsensual pornography reform, Professor Franks’s 
numerous articles, speaking engagements, and research projects provide an ex-
pansive overview of both the major issues—and the major need—for nonconsen-
sual pornography criminalization. 
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Part II of this Note discusses the IPPA, its current state law counter-
parts, and the legal and constitutional implications of the criminali-
zation of revenge porn. Part III explores essentially the same analy-
sis as the IPPA discussion in Part II; however, it focuses on the pro-
posed GPS Act instead.12 Part IV attempts to reconcile the two po-
tential laws and the reasons behind why there appears to be discrep-
ancies in their legitimacy, focusing on the ACLU’s approach, as 
well as a societal analysis. Using this attempted reconciliation, Part 
V discusses a potential strategy to implement both bills effectively, 
without constitutional concern, and concludes with a brief summary 
and discussion of the future of these potential privacy laws.  
Overall, this Note argues that the inconsistency between re-
sponses to these two bills can be explained by the concept of a pri-
vacy hierarchy. That is, certain forms of privacy are privileged 
above others. Privacy that relates to corporate or governmental in-
trusion is afforded higher protections than privacy that relates to 
bodily autonomy and crimes perpetrated against women. Given the 
inherent injustice in the trivialization of harms against women and 
girls, and the apparent lack of empathy such trivialization derives 
from, this Note argues for the dismantlement of this unjustified hi-
erarchy.  
I. “REVENGE PORN”: THE NEED FOR CRIMINALIZATION 
Somewhat of a misnomer, “revenge porn” is the colloquialism 
used for the dissemination—typically online—of a sexually explicit, 
                                                                                                         
 12  In an attempt at efficiency, this Note does not purport to analyze, or even 
acknowledge, each and every critique of the respective bills and their underlying 
constitutional issues. Entire law review articles can and have been dedicated to 
the subjects individually. Instead, this Note will attempt to broadly describe some 
of the concerns and policies highlighted in academic and legal literature regarding 
each subject, and how these bills can be reconciled. See, e.g., Alix Iris Cohen, 
Comment, Nonconsensual Pornography and the First Amendment: A Case for a 
New Unprotected Category of Speech, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 300 (2015) (conduct-
ing a purely First Amendment unprotected category of speech analysis for poten-
tial nonconsensual pornography laws); Stephen Wagner, Stopping Police in Their 
Tracks: Protecting Cellular Location Information Privacy in the Twenty-First 
Century, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 201 (2014) (addressing Fourth Amendment 
implications of federal geolocational legislation).  
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or intimate, photograph, video, or other multimedia apparatus, with-
out the consent of the depicted individual.13 “Revenge porn” has re-
cently been added to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “sexually 
explicit images of a person posted online without that person’s con-
sent especially as a form of revenge or harassment.”14 Hence, the 
misnomer. As discussed below, many current state revenge porn 
laws require an “intent to harm” element for criminal liability.15 
However, this nonconsensual dissemination need not derive from 
vengeful purposes or personal animus, as many perpetrators partic-
ipate simply with entertainment or economic motivations in mind.16  
Considered a “kingpin” of revenge porn,17 Craig Brittain de-
fended his business model, claiming, “[w]e don’t want anyone 
shamed or hurt[;] we just want the pictures there for entertainment 
purposes and business.”18 In 2015, members of the Penn State chap-
ter of the Kappa Delta Rho fraternity were investigated upon dis-
covery that photographs of unconscious naked women were posted 
                                                                                                         
 13  Frequently Asked Questions, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cyber-
civilrights.org/faqs/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2019). 
 14  Revenge Porn, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2017). 
 15  See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203(2) (2018), https://le.utah.gov/ 
xcode/Title76/Chapter5b/C76-5b-S203_2014040320140513.pdf (“An actor com-
mits the offense of distribution of intimate images if the actor, with the intent to 
cause emotional distress or harm, knowingly or intentionally distributes to any 
third party any intimate image of an individual who is 18 years of age or 
older . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also infra Part II.  
 16  Brian Maass, ‘Revenge Porn’ Website Has Colorado Women Outraged, 
CBS DENVER (Feb. 3, 2013, 10:13 PM), https://denver.cbslocal.com/2013/02/03/ 
revenge-porn-website-has-colorado-woman-outraged/; Rob Price, Bitcoin Beg-
gars Try to Profit Off #CelebGate, DAILY DOT (Sept. 1, 2014, 1:46 PM), 
www.dailydot.com/crime/celebgate-jennifer-lawrence-nude-leakers-bitcoin/. 
 17  Jessica Contrera, ‘Revenge Porn’ Distributors Are Finally Seeing Legal 
Ramifications. This Web Site Owner Will Go to Prison for 18 Years., WASH. POST 
(Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertain-
ment/wp/2015/04/05/revenge-porn-distributors-are-finally-seeing-legal-ramifi-
cations-this-web-site-owner-will-go-to-prison-for-18-years/. 
 18  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1288 n.233 (quoting 
Maass, supra note 16). Brittain further stated, “we’re not doing anything, not try-
ing to hurt them, we’re not out for revenge or being malicious, we just want en-
tertainment, we want the money, we’re after making the buck.” Maass, supra note 
16. 
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to their brothers-only Facebook page.19 Members defended the Fa-
cebook page, claiming it was purely “satirical” and “wasn’t intended 
to hurt anyone.”20 In 2014, in what became known as #CelebGate, 
hackers leaked hundreds of intimate photos of celebrities in ex-
change for the now-popularized cryptocurrency known as Bitcoin, 
previously a common currency exchanged on the dark web.21  
Until the occurrence of numerous high-profile cases, such as the 
#CelebGate scandal, the topic of revenge porn was essentially non-
existent in both the social, legal, and public discourse.22 Jennifer 
Lawrence, award-winning actress and #CelebGate victim, knows 
firsthand the harm suffered at the hands of revenge porn perpetra-
tors: “It is not a scandal. It is a sex crime.”23  
Public interest has peaked due to this influx of celebrity notori-
ety and the ever-increasing prevalence of social media; however, 
until recently, even these nonconsensual occurrences were normal-
ized as a cost of fame and/or the risk assumed by exposing oneself 
to intimate images in the first place.24 Often overlooked, however, 
are the thousands of everyday laywomen (and men) who are victim-
ized by these predatory and humiliating invasions of privacy. 
                                                                                                         
 19  Tyler Kingkade, Police Say Penn State Fraternity Circulated Nude Photos 
of ‘Unsuspecting Victims,’ HUFFPOST (Mar. 17, 2015, 1:55 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/17/penpenn-state-fraternity-nude-pho-
tos_n_6886476.html; see also Lindsey Bever, Penn State Suspends Kappa Delta 
Rho Fraternity for 3 Years Following Findings of Hazing and Sexual Harassment, 
WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/ 
2015/05/27/penn-state-suspends-kappa-delta-rho-fraternity-for-3-years-follow-
ing-findings-of-hazing-and-sexual-harassment/. 
 20  Holly Otterbein, Member of Penn State’s Kappa Delta Rho Defends Fra-
ternity, PHILA. MAG. (Mar. 18, 2015, 4:36 PM), www.phillymag.com/news 
/2015/03/18/member-of-penn-states-kappa-delta-rho-defends-fraternity/. 
 21  See Price, supra note 16.  
 22  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1255. 
 23  Sam Kashner, Both Huntress and Prey, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2014), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-photo-hack-
ing-privacy. 
 24  See Becky Peterson, Revenge Porn Is Illegal in California – Here’s What 
Could Happen to Rob Kardashian for Tweeting Explicit Photos of His Ex, BUS. 
INSIDER (July 5, 2017, 8:50 PM), www.businessinsider.com/rob-kardashian-le-
gal-risk-for-chyna-blac-revenge-porn-2017-7; Dave Quinn, Mischa Barton Testi-
fies in Revenge-Porn Case as Lawyer Declares ‘Another Court Victory,’ PEOPLE 
(July 1, 2017, 2:59 PM), www.people.com/tv/mischa-barton-revenge-porn-tes-
tify-july.  
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In the first national study to examine self-reporting of noncon-
sensual pornography victimization and perpetration, it was reported 
that one in every eight social media users has been the target of non-
consensual pornography.25 In a similar study developed in 2013, 
ninety percent (90%) of respondents who self-identified as victims 
of nonconsensual pornography were female.26 The popular social 
media site Facebook received more than 51,000 reports of revenge 
porn in January 2017 alone. 27 However, the potential pool of vic-
tims is vastly expanding, as the practice of sending intimate images 
within the context of an intimate relationship has gained prevalence 
in this new age of social media and technological dating.28 A 2014 
survey of 1,100 New Yorkers revealed that approximately forty-five 
percent (45%) of respondents have recorded themselves having 
sex.29  According to a 2014 study by software security company 
McAfee, fifty-four percent (54%) of adults in the United States send 
or receive intimate text messages, nude photos, and/or explicit vid-
eos.30 The technological advances of the most recent years, as well 
as the ever-increasing usage of social media platforms,31 have the 
                                                                                                         
 25  ASIA A. EATON ET AL., CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, 2017 NATION-
WIDE ONLINE STUDY OF NONCONSENSUAL PORN VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRA-
TION: A SUMMARY REPORT 6, 11 (2017), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/CCRI-2017-Research-Report.pdf. 
 26  CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, CCRI’S 2013 NONCONSENSUAL POR-
NOGRAPHY (NCP) RESEARCH RESULTS 1 (2013), www.cybercivilrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/NCP-2013-Study-Research-Results-1.pdf. 
 27  Nick Hopkins & Olivia Solon, Facebook Flooded with ‘Sextortion’ and 
‘Revenge Porn’, Files Reveal, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2017, 9:52 AM), 
www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/22/facebook-flooded-with-sextortion-
and-revenge-porn-files-reveal. “The company relies on users to report most abu-
sive content, meaning the real scale of the problem could be much greater.” Id. 
 28  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1257–58.  
 29  New Yorkers Reveal What Their Sex Lives Are Really Like, N.Y. POST 
(Sept. 3, 2014, 6:17 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/09/03/new-yorkers-reveal-
what-their-sex-lives-are-really-like/.  
 30  Consumer Online Behavior and Attitudes Toward PC Health, MCAFEE, 
http://sawebdev.ca/mcafee/global_stats/US/2.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2018). 
 31  AARON SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL ME-
DIA USE IN 2018, at 2 (2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-me-
dia-use-in-2018/ (follow “Complete Report PDF” under “Report Materials”) 
(showing that social media use across all measured platforms—YouTube, Face-
book, Instagram, Pinterest, Snapchat, LinkedIn, Twitter, and WhatsApp—all in-
creased between 2012 and 2018); Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 
2019] THE PRIVACY HIERARCHY 577 
potential to raise these statistics exponentially. Thus, the harm cre-
ated by perpetrators of revenge porn amounts not just to individual 
harms of victims, but to an overall social harm: suppressing a prac-
tice of sexual expression that is more common than society and law-
makers would like to believe.32 
As highlighted in depth by Professors Franks and Citron, these 
individual harms, however, can be both irreparable and decimating 
to their victims’ livelihoods and mental health.33 Intimate photos 
distributed online can reach millions of viewers with the click of a 
mouse, and many victims report that their images were likewise dis-
tributed to friends, family members, employers, and coworkers, pro-
ducing an irremediable stain on their personal and professional rela-
tionships.34 Furthermore, victims often report subsequent online and 
in-person harassment, including reports of cyberbullying, stalking, 
and threats of physical harm or sexual assault.35 This is especially 
true when personal information, such as the victim’s phone number, 
address, email, or social media accounts, is posted contemporane-
ously, as they often are.36 Sadly, numerous victims resorted to sui-
cide to escape the continuous and incessant castigation deriving 
from the images’ distribution and resulting invasion of privacy.37  
                                                                                                         
5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ (“When Pew Re-
search Center began tracking social media adoption in 2005, just 5% of American 
adults used at least one of these platforms. By 2011 that share had risen to half of 
all Americans, and today 69% of the public uses some type of social media.”). 
 32  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1285. 
 33  See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge 
Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 350–53 (2014); see also EATON ET AL., su-
pra note 25, at 23–24.  
 34  See Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 350–53 (2014); Franks, “Revenge 
Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1263–64.  
 35  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1259, 1263; see also, 
e.g., Annmarie Chiarini, Opinion, I Was a Victim of Revenge Porn. I Don’t Want 
Anyone Else to Face This, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2013, 7:30 AM), www.theguard-
ian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/19/revenge-porn-victim-maryland-law-
change. 
 36  See Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 350–51.  
 37  Nina Burleigh, Sexting, Shame and Suicide, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 17, 
2013, 6:20 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/sexting-
shame-and-suicide-72148/. Fifty-one percent (51%) of victims of revenge porn 
reported contemplating suicide after the distribution of their intimate images. 
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In September 2012, Audrie Pott, a fifteen-year-old high school 
student, attended a party where once she became extremely inebri-
ated, a group of teenagers brought her upstairs, undressed her, drew 
on her naked body with markers, and proceeded to take pictures of 
themselves sexually assaulting Ms. Pott.38 A week later, Ms. Pott 
committed suicide in her bathroom.39 In the spring of 2015, Tiziana 
Cantone sent an explicit video of herself to her ex-boyfriend, who 
subsequently posted the video on various social media platforms.40 
After her video reached millions of viewers, she became the butt of 
what is commonly referred to as a “meme,” or in other words, the 
butt of a viral Internet joke, with portions of her sex tape printed on 
t-shirts in her native country of Italy.41 Humiliating Ms. Cantone be-
came “a national pastime.”42 In a desperate attempt to “regain her 
privacy,” Ms. Cantone ended her own life.43 These are just a few of 
the tragic outcomes of victims suffering at the mercy of nonconsen-
sual pornography. 
Further, as Professor Franks discussed, nonconsensual pornog-
raphy can often play a larger role in other underlying or overarching 
crimes, as perpetrators use the threat of nonconsensual porn as lev-
erage to blackmail their victims into nondisclosure of the crimes.44 
Human traffickers often coerce unwilling victims into the sex trade 
or prostitution by threatening to divulge their private images.45 Rap-
ists and other sexually violent predators document their attacks to 
                                                                                                         
Sameer Hinduja, Revenge Porn Research, Laws, and Help for Victims, CYBER-
BULLYING RES. CTR., https://cyberbullying.org/revenge-porn-research-laws-help-
victims (last visited Jan. 2, 2018). 
 38  Burleigh, supra note 37.  
 39  Id.  
 40  Emily Fairbairn, Revenge Porn Suicide Shame: Tiziana Cantone Killed 
Herself over Leaked Sex Tape Because in Italy Sex for Fun Is Still a Sin, SUN 
(Sept. 16, 2016, 11:55 PM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/living/1799725/tiziana-
cantone-killed-herself-over-leaked-sex-tape-because-in-italy-sex-for-fun-is-still-
a-sin/. 
 41  Id.  
 42  Id.  
 43  Id.  
 44  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1258; see, e.g., Chia-
rini, supra note 35.  
 45  See, e.g., Marion Brooks, The World of Human Trafficking: One Woman’s 
Story, NBC CHI. (Feb. 21, 2013, 1:52 PM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/investi-
gations/human-trafficking-alex-campbell-192415731.html.  
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embarrass their victims, dissuading them from going to the police.46 
Victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking 
often face the insufferable choice of either reporting their attackers 
and having to relive the indignity, humiliation, and further suffering 
resulting from the dissemination of their explicit images or videos, 
or not reporting their attackers and suffering in silence.47  
Some scholars and legislators alike argue that existing criminal 
laws are sufficient to combat the practice of nonconsensual pornog-
raphy and that rather than drafting targeted revenge porn litigation, 
offenders should be punished utilizing existing harassment, extor-
tion, and cyber-stalking laws.48 However, the failure to criminalize 
the practice of nonconsensual pornography perpetuates the practice 
of gendered sexual abuse and the “pernicious belief that men have 
the right to use women and girls sexually without their consent.”49 
Furthermore, failing to define nonconsensual pornography as a 
crime in and of itself likewise perpetuates a victim-blaming culture, 
where the victim is punished—and his or her harms trivialized—for 
engaging in the normal human behavior of sexual expression.50 
Moreover, as described below, the definition of nonconsensual por-
nography and the many forms that it may take may not conform to 
the traditional and statutory notions of “harassment,” and thus, may 
be independently insufficient to combat the perpetration of revenge 
porn.51  
                                                                                                         
 46  See, e.g., Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape Case Unfolds on Web and 
Splits City, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/ 
17/sports/high-school-football-rape-case-unfolds-online-and-divides-steuben-
ville-ohio.html; Tara Culp-Ressler, 16-Year-Old’s Rape Goes Viral on Social Me-
dia: ‘No Human Being Deserved This,’ THINKPROGRESS (July 10, 2014, 1:07 
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/07/10/3458564/rape-viral-social-me-
dia-jada/.  
 47  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1258–59.  
 48  Rachel Budde Patton, Note, Taking the Sting out of Revenge Porn: Using 
Criminal Statutes to Safeguard Sexual Autonomy in the Digital Age, 16 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 407, 436–42 (2015).  
 49  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1259.  
 50  Id. at 1321.  
 51  Erin Donaghue, Judge Throws out New York “Revenge Porn” Case, CBS 
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-throws-out-new-
york-revenge-porn-case/.  
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For example, in what was referred to as New York’s first re-
venge porn case, Ian Barber was charged with aggravated harass-
ment (among other things) when he posted nude photos of his then-
girlfriend to Twitter and also sent the images to her employer and 
family.52 In dismissing all charges against Barber, the judge noted 
that New York’s definition of aggravated harassment requires that 
“the defendant undertake some communication with the complain-
ant,” and because Barber did not actually send these photographs to 
his girlfriend, the aggravated harassment charge could not stand.53 
Moreover, many state and federal harassment and stalking laws re-
quire that the defendant be involved in a “course of conduct” in-
tended to harm or harass,54 meaning that a “single act of uploading 
a private image would generally not constitute harassment.”55  
Furthermore, damage suits against websites that refuse to com-
ply with notice-and-takedown procedures have generally been un-
successful.56 This is due to the ever-present obstacle of section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which provides that 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”57  Section 230 effectively 
grants these websites immunity from liability so long as the site does 
not alter or revise the posted material.58 
                                                                                                         
 52  People v. Barber, No. 2013NY059761, 2014 WL 641316, at *1 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. Feb. 18, 2014).  
 53  Id. at *5–6. 
  54 Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1301 (citing N.Y. PE-
NAL LAW §§ 120.50, 240.25 (McKinney 2018)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) 
(2012) (defining that stalking occurs when a person who, “with the intent 
to . . . harass . . . engage[s] in a course of conduct that . . . causes, attempts to 
cause, or would be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress”); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2709 (2018).  
 55  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1301.  
 56  Eric Goldman, What Should We Do About Revenge Porn Sites Like 
Texxxan?, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2013, 1:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eric-
goldman/2013/01/28/what-should-we-do-about-revenge-porn-sites-like-
texxxan/#1016c9a17eff. 
 57  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
 58  Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revenge Porn, State Law, and Free Speech, 48 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 57, 67, 67 n.35 (2014); see, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 
1096, 1099–1106 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[I]t appears that subsection (c)(1) only protects 
from liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom 
a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker 
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Civil remedies likewise found their place in the fight against 
nonconsensual pornography, as victims may resort to the tort rem-
edy of breach of confidentiality,59 intentional or reckless infliction 
of emotional distress,60 the privacy tort of public disclosure of pri-
vate facts, 61  and copyright law 62  as avenues of redress for the 
wrongs committed against them. In the high-profile case of Bollea 
v. Gawker Media, LLC, a Florida judge upheld the $140 million ver-
dict against Gawker Media for publishing an explicit sex tape of for-
mer professional wrestler, Hulk Hogan.63 Hogan’s causes of action 
                                                                                                         
(3) of information provided by another information content provider.”); Chi. Law-
yers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 
669–72 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[G]iven § 230(c)(1) [the plaintiff] cannot sue the mes-
senger just because the message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful 
discrimination.”); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 
418–19 (1st Cir. 2007) (agreeing with other courts to “interpret[] Section 230 im-
munity broadly, so as to effectuate Congress’s ‘policy choice . . . not to deter 
harmful online speech through the . . . route of imposing tort liability on compa-
nies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious mes-
sages.’” (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 
1997))); Gavra v. Google Inc., No. 5:12–CV–06547–PSG, 2013 WL 3788241, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013) (“A website is liable for the unlawful content of 
online material only if the website contributes materially . . . to its alleged unlaw-
fulness. Merely providing third parties with neutral tools to create web content, 
even if the website knows those parties are using the tools to create illegal content, 
does not create liability, nor does refraining from removing objectionable content, 
despite receiving notice.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 59  See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual 
Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 722–32 (2017); cf. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss 
and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of 
Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 908–37 (2006) (discussing a contractual 
theory of confidentiality rather than a tort theory). 
 60  See, e.g., Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 357–58; Caroline Drinnon, 
Note, When Fame Takes Away the Right to Privacy in One’s Body: Revenge Porn 
and Tort Remedies for Public Figures, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 209, 
221–22 (2017).  
 61  See, e.g., Drinnon, supra note 60, at 222–23. 
 62  See, e.g., Amanda Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Re-
venge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 439–46 (2014); Caitlin 
Dewey, How Copyright Became the Best Defense Against Revenge Porn, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-inter-
sect/wp/2014/09/08/how-copyright-became-the-best-defense-against-revenge-
porn/?utm_term=.759fa63a0c9a.  
 63  Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 
2012); Eriq Gardner, Judge Upholds Hulk Hogan’s $140 Million Trial Victory 
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included invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, publication of pri-
vate matter, and violation of the right to publicity.64 Though consid-
ered a civil victory against a perpetrator of nonconsensual pornog-
raphy, this case does little to address the underlying problems in re-
lying on civil remedies to address the issue of nonconsensual por-
nography. 
First and foremost, the vast majority of victims of nonconsensual 
pornography do not have the requisite resources available to a per-
son of high notoriety like Mr. Hogan65—who’s litigation was finan-
cially supported by Silicon Valley billionaire Peter Thiel.66 The is-
sue is further exacerbated by the fact that many victims are forced 
out of their employment positions because of the embarrassment and 
tarnished reputation that accompanies having one’s private images 
posted online (and sometimes sent directly to said employer).67 Fur-
thermore, civil actions also require that the very material harming 
the victim—i.e., his or her intimate images or videos—be further 
displayed to attorneys, judges, or other members of the judicial pro-
ceedings.68 “The irony of privacy actions is that they generally re-
quire further breaches of privacy to be effective.”69  
Civil remedies have their limitations both in addressing the 
harms of certain individuals and in combatting the pervasive under-
lying problem of nonconsensual pornography—a lack of deter-
rence.70 Copyright law, for example, will only apply if the victim 
actually owns the material disseminated online, which requires that 
the victim took the image or video him or herself.71 While eighty 
percent (80%) of revenge porn images are selfies,72 many victims 
report that their images were either taken by their significant other 
                                                                                                         
Against Gawker, HOLLYWOOD REP. (May 25, 2016, 6:56 AM), https://www.hol-
lywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-upholds-hulk-hogans-140-897301. 
 64  Complaint at 9–18, Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (No. 8:12-cv-02348).  
 65  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1299–1300. 
 66  Nicole K. Chipi, Note, Eat Your Vitamins and Say Your Prayers: Bollea v. 
Gawker, Revenge Litigation Funding, and the Fate of the Fourth Estate, 72 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 269, 281–83 (2017). 
 67  Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 352–53, 358.  
 68  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1299.  
 69  Id.  
 70  See id. at 1299–300.  
 71  Levendowski, supra note 62, at 440. 
 72  Id. at 426.  
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with their consent, taken without their knowledge, or in some cases, 
such as the #CelebGate scandal, hacked and obtained without the 
victim’s knowledge or consent.73 Moreover, a successful claim for 
the intentional infliction of emotional distress is rare, as courts have 
found that “[w]here the gravamen of a plaintiff’s complaint is really 
another tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress should not 
be available.”74 
Existing laws—both criminal and civil—are insufficient to fully 
address the issues presented by the exacerbation of nonconsensual 
pornography.75 Thus, nonconsensual pornography must be crimi-
nalized in and of itself as a separate offense.76 
II. THE INTIMATE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT: AN ATTEMPT AT THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINALIZATION OF REVENGE PORN 
Before 2003, no state explicitly criminalized nonconsensual adult 
pornography and victims were left with little to no remedial courses 
of action.77 Prior to 2013, only three states—New Jersey, Alaska, 
and Texas—criminalized the unauthorized disclosure of nonconsen-
sual pornography.78 Currently, forty-one states and the District of 
                                                                                                         
 73  Id. at 424, 424–25 nn.9–12. Levendowski mentions that about ten percent 
(10%) of victims reported that the pictures were taken without their knowledge, 
twelve percent (12%) were photoshopped photos, forty percent (40%) were 
hacked, and thirty-six percent (36%) were uploaded by ex-lovers. Id.  
 74  Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 176 (Tex. App. 2016) (quoting Hoff-
man–La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004)). 
 75  See generally Adrienne N. Kitchen, Note, The Need to Criminalize Re-
venge Porn: How a Law Protecting Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul of the First 
Amendment, 90 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 247 (2015) (arguing revenge porn victims 
currently have no effective legal remedy). 
 76  See generally Citron & Franks, supra note 33 (arguing for direct criminal-
ization of nonconsensual pornography).  
 77  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1255. In 2003, New 
Jersey became the first state to officially enact a criminal revenge porn law. Id. at 
1255 n.23; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2018). 
 78  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1280.  
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Columbia have enacted criminal legislation to address the harms as-
sociated with nonconsensual pornography.79 In most of the remain-
ing states, legislation is pending. 80  Technological developments 
have likewise emerged, with industry leaders, such as Twitter,81 Fa-
cebook,82 Microsoft,83 Google,84 and Reddit,85 banning nonconsen-
sual pornography on their sites, and taking strides to implement ef-
fective reporting and removal procedures on their platforms. The 
                                                                                                         
 79  The states with current revenge porn laws are as follows: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 41 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER 
C.R. INITIATIVE, www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws (last visited Dec. 
30, 2018). Additionally, Ohio’s Governor signed a law criminalizing revenge porn 
in December 2018, which will go into effect in March 2019. Javonte Anderson, 
Kasich Signs Law to Stop ‘Revenge Porn,’ TOLEDO BLADE (Jan. 2, 2019, 6:00 
AM), https://www.toledoblade.com/local/education/2019/01/02/governor-kasi 
ch-signs-law-to-stop-revenge-porn/stories/20181228126. 
 80  See, e.g., Sandra Chapman, Indiana Senator Proposes Bill to Make Re-
venge Porn Illegal, WTHR (Jan. 10, 2018, 5:42 PM), https://www.wthr.com/arti-
cle/indiana-senator-proposes-bill-to-make-revenge-porn-illegal; Senate Passes 
Bill to Prevent Revenge Porn, N.Y. ST. SENATE (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senate-passes-bill-prevent-
revenge-porn; see also Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1281. 
 81  Hayley Tsukayama, Twitter Updates Its Rules to Specifically Ban ‘Revenge 
Porn,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2015/03/11/twitter-updates-its-rules-to-specifically-ban-revenge-
porn/. 
 82  Sara Ashley O’Brien, Facebook Launches Tools to Combat Revenge Porn, 
CNN (Apr. 5, 2017, 10:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/05/technol-
ogy/facebook-revenge-porn/index.html. 
 83  Brian Fung, Microsoft Is Stepping up the War on Revenge Porn – and Val-
idating the Right to Be Forgotten, WASH. POST (July 22, 2015), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/07/22/how-silicon-valleys-war-on-re-
venge-porn-is-validating-the-right-to-be-forgotten/?utm_term=.722d5e2e5068. 
 84  Amit Singhal, “Revenge Porn” and Search, GOOGLE: PUB. POL’Y BLOG 
(June 19, 2015), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2015/06/revenge-porn-
and-search.html. 
 85  Andrea Peterson, Reddit Is Finally Cracking Down on Revenge Porn, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/ 
wp/2015/02/24/reddit-is-finally-cracking-down-on-revenge-
porn/?utm_term=.fd340912c999. 
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fight against nonconsensual pornography has vastly expanded; how-
ever, the array of arsenal combatting this crime still lacks a federally 
mandated criminal law prohibiting the nonconsensual dissemination 
or distribution of an individual’s intimate images or videos.86 
On July 14, 2016, California Congresswoman Jackie Speier first 
introduced the IPPA in Congress,87 which was the culmination of an 
“extensive, years-long collaboration with civil liberties groups, 
criminal law practitioners, constitutional scholars, tech industry 
leaders, and victim advocates.”88 The IPPA mandates 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Whoever knowingly uses the 
mail, any interactive computer service or electronic 
communication service or electronic communication 
system of interstate commerce, or any other facility 
of interstate or foreign commerce to distribute a vis-
ual depiction of a person who is identifiable from the 
image itself or information displayed in connection 
with the image and who is engaging in sexually ex-
plicit conduct, or of the naked genitals or post-pubes-
cent female nipple of the person, with reckless disre-
gard for the person’s lack of consent to the distribu-
tion, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 5 years, or both.  
(b) EXCEPTIONS.—  
(1) LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER 
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.—This section—  
(A) does not prohibit any lawful law 
                                                                                                         
 86  Following a military scandal involving the distribution of hundreds of sex-
ually explicit images of female Marines to an all-male Marine Facebook group, 
the House of Representatives unanimously passed the PRIVATE Act, which 
would amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) to proscribe dis-
closure of such material without consent. See H.R. 2052, 115th Cong. (2017); 
Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1281.  
 87  See Press Release, Jackie Speier, Rep., Congresswoman Speier, Fellow 
Members of Cong. Take on Nonconsensual Pornography, AKA Revenge Porn 
(July 14, 2016), https://speier.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/congress-
woman-speier-fellow-members-congress-take-nonconsensual.  
 88  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1282. 
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enforcement, correctional, or intelligence ac-
tivity;  
(B) shall not apply in the case of an 
individual reporting unlawful activity; and  
(C) shall not apply to a subpoena or 
court order for use in a legal proceeding.  
(2) VOLUNTARY PUBLIC OR COMMER-
CIAL EXPOSURE.—This section does not apply to 
a visual depiction of a voluntary exposure of an indi-
vidual’s own naked genitals or post-pubescent fe-
male nipple or an individual’s voluntary engagement 
in sexually explicit conduct if such exposure takes 
place in public or in a lawful commercial setting.  
(3) CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF VISUAL 
DEPICTIONS EXCEPTED.—This section shall not 
apply in the case of a visual depiction, the disclosure 
of which is in the bona fide public interest.  
(4) TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND IN-
TERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS.—This section 
shall not apply to any provider of an interactive com-
puter service as defined in section 230(f)(2) of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230 (f)(2)) 
with regard to content provided by another infor-
mation content provider, as defined in section 
230(f)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 
U.S.C. 230(f)(3)) unless such provider of an interac-
tive computer service intentionally promotes or so-
licits content that it knows to be in violation of this 
section.  
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:  
(1) Except as otherwise provided, any term 
used in this section has the meaning given that term 
in section 1801.  
(2) The term “visual depiction” means any 
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photograph, film, or video, whether produced by 
electronic, mechanical, or other means.  
(3) The term “sexually explicit conduct” has 
the meaning given that term in section 2256(2)(A).89  
In summation, the bill amends the federal criminal code, making 
it unlawful to knowingly distribute a photograph, film, or video of a 
nude individual or an individual engaging in sexually explicit acts. 
The bill requires “reckless disregard for the [depicted] person’s lack 
of consent” if and when the person is “identifiable from the image 
itself or information displayed in connection with the image.”90 The 
bill drew widespread bipartisan support, the approval of Facebook, 
Twitter, and other public interest groups, and also received the en-
dorsement of various constitutional law scholars, including Erwin 
Chemerinsky.91 
Notably missing from the proposed law, however, is any intent 
to harm or harass,92 an element required for criminal liability, which 
is commonly featured in various state law counterparts to the 
                                                                                                         
 89  Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. (2016).  
 90  Id.  
 91  Franks, It’s Time, supra note 8.  
 92  This “intent to harm, humiliate, distress, harass, etc.” requirement will be 
interchangeable with a “motive” requirement in this Note. Professor Franks ex-
plains how and why the two similar terms may be confused in an analysis of leg-
islative creation and implementation of criminal laws: 
  Those who insist that nonconsensual pornography laws 
must include intent to harass or humiliate requirements some-
times do so because they confuse the word “intent” used in such 
requirements with “intent” in the sense of mens rea. The ambi-
guity of the word “intent” in the criminal law context is unfor-
tunate, as it apparently leads some to conclude that the word 
“intent” must literally be included in all criminal statutes or that 
phrases beginning with the word “intent” are expressions of 
mens rea. But mens rea does not mean “intent” in the narrow 
sense of purposefulness, but rather can be any one of several 
culpable mental states, including knowledge, recklessness, or 
negligence with regard to social harm . . . .  
 “Intent to harass” requirements, despite the phrasing, are 
not intent requirements at all, in the sense of mens rea, but are 
in fact motive requirements.  
Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1289. 
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IPPA.93 This drew some admonition from critics, claiming that the 
law would create a multitude of constitutional and social issues, in-
cluding First Amendment and over-criminalization problems. 94 
However, in analyzing the current state revenge porn laws below, 
this “intent to harm” element arguably may not be necessary to avoid 
running afoul of the Constitution and may itself create constitutional 
quandaries.95 
A. Current Revenge Porn Laws, Intent, and Why It Matters 
As mentioned previously, there has been an enormous increase 
in state awareness and proactive legislation against nonconsensual 
pornography over the past five years. However, many of these state 
laws are riddled with issues, making them difficult to enforce—and 
even harder to prosecute—by state law enforcement. These legisla-
tive vulnerabilities include over-burdensome elemental require-
ments that lead to narrow applicability for what has become an ex-
tremely pervasive criminal matter.96 These similar state laws may 
also face constitutional susceptibilities, including First Amendment 
issues.97  
One over-burdensome prerequisite for a current state law crimi-
nalizing nonconsensual pornography is the requirement that the 
crime be perpetrated by a current or former sexual or intimate part-
ner. For example, Pennsylvania’s current law asserts 
[A] person commits the offense of unlawful dissem-
ination of intimate image[s] if, with intent to harass, 
annoy or alarm a current or former sexual or intimate 
partner, the person disseminates a visual depiction of 
the current or former sexual or intimate partner in a 
                                                                                                         
 93  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A)(3) (2018); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 3131(a) (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203(2) (2018), 
https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title76/Chapter5b/C76-5b-S203_201404032014 
0513.pdf (“An actor commits the offense of distribution of intimate images if the 
actor, with the intent to cause emotional distress or harm, knowingly or intention-
ally distributes to any third party any intimate image of an individual who is 18 
years of age or older . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 94  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1302–27. 
 95  See id. at 1289. 
 96  Id. at 1282. 
 97  Id.  
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state of nudity or engaged in sexual conduct.98 
This narrow requirement overlooks the reality that, though the term 
“revenge porn” indicates that this kind of conduct is often perpe-
trated by a current or former intimate partner, many of these crimes 
are carried out by individuals who have no intimate or sexual affili-
ation with the victim, such as friends, acquaintances, or, as previ-
ously discussed, strangers.99  
A similar issue arises when a state law criminalizing nonconsen-
sual pornography requires an “intent to harass” element, or, in other 
words, requires the perpetrator to have a nefarious motive in distrib-
uting these images.100 Prosecutors will be unable to prove this req-
uisite motive for many offenders, because many perpetrators will 
commit this reprehensible conduct without any vengeful or vindic-
tive motive.101 For example, perpetrators who distribute photos or 
videos presuming that the victims depicted will never unearth the 
perpetrator’s conduct will not be held criminally liable for their con-
duct in states with this intent to harm requirement.102 As previously 
discussed, Pennsylvania’s current law, notwithstanding the “former 
sexual or intimate partner” requirement, also maintains an “intent to 
harass, annoy, or alarm” requirement;103 thus, the members of the 
Penn State chapter of Kappa Delta Rho who shared photos of naked, 
unconscious women on their Facebook group were able to act with 
impunity.104 
These intent to harm and motive requirements may also be con-
stitutionally problematic, which is exactly what they are purportedly 
intended to amend. 
B. Legal Implications of Revenge Porn Laws 
Generally, there are four recognized theories of criminal punish-
ment that attempt to describe policy rationale for the societal use of 
                                                                                                         
 98  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131(a) (2018). 
 99  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1288 (“[A] signif-
icant portion of nonconsensual pornography cases involves people who do not 
even know each other.”); see, e.g., Price, supra note 16. 
 100  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1287–90. 
 101  See supra Part I. 
 102  See Otterbein, supra note 20.  
 103  § 3131(a). 
 104  See Otterbein, supra note 20.  
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criminal regulations—deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and in-
capacitation.105 The strongest of these justifications underlying the 
necessity for the criminalization of nonconsensual pornography lies 
within the concept of deterrence.106 Deterrence is “[t]he act or pro-
cess of discouraging certain behavior, particularly by fear; [espe-
cially] as a goal of criminal law, the prevention of criminal behavior 
by fear of punishment.”107  
In a 2017 national study on nonconsensual pornography, the 
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (“CCRI”) discerned that of respondents 
who admitted to having engaged in nonconsensual pornography, the 
majority indicated that criminal penalties would have been the most 
likely deterrent to stop them from having engaged in such con-
duct.108 Because of the insufficiency of civil laws, it is often difficult 
for victims of nonconsensual pornography to be fully made 
whole;109 therefore, critics against the criminalization of nonconsen-
sual pornography often overlook the fact that the real harm created 
by this conduct is an unqualified invasion of privacy—of which the 
only remedial measure competent enough to “make the victim 
whole” would be for the conduct to never have occurred in the first 
place.110  
Because of the technological nature of the crime, once a picture 
is disseminated, it is nearly impossible to determine how many in-
dividuals have viewed, saved, or redistributed the intimate images 
or videos, making it just as impossible for the victim’s harm to ac-
tually be remedied.111 Accordingly, the legislators supporting the 
                                                                                                         
 105  See generally Mike C. Materni, Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of 
Justice, 2 BRITISH J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 263, 266–99 (2013). 
 106  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1303–04. 
 107  Deterrence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 108  EATON ET AL., supra note 25, at 22.  
 109  See supra Part I. 
 110  See Sarah Jeong, Opinion, Revenge Porn Is Bad. Criminalizing It Is Worse, 
WIRED (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:30 AM), www.wired.com/2013/10/why-criminalizing-
revenge-porn-is-a-bad-idea/. 
 111  Charlotte Alter, ‘It’s Like Having an Incurable Disease’: Inside the Fight 
Against Revenge Porn, TIME (June 13, 2017), www.time.com/4811561/revenge-
porn/ (discussing how “there’s no way to guarantee [an image] hasn’t been copied, 
screenshotted, or stored on a cache somewhere”). According to Reg Harnish, CEO 
of cyber-risk assessment firm GreyCastle Security, “[o]nce the images and videos 
have been exposed or published, the internet is permanent . . . . There are literally 
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criminalization of nonconsensual pornography should—and do—
focus on the deterrent effects of these laws. However, these deterrent 
effects have also been categorized and labeled as unwarranted 
chilling effects, running afoul of many policy justifications underly-
ing the United States Constitution’s conceptualization of fairness. 
1. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Though there have been differing bases for challenges to the 
criminalization of nonconsensual pornography, constitutional chal-
lenges based on the First Amendment and over-breadth “void for 
vagueness” challenges remain the most persistent.112  
a. First Amendment Free Speech Challenges 
With the advent of widespread internet use for various forms of 
expression, including blogging, social media use, and a new age of 
journalism to name a few, came a whirlwind of free speech advo-
cacy pushing for increased protections of online expression. Much 
of the criticism regarding legislative reform on nonconsensual por-
nography, particularly that from major tech industry leaders, derives 
from the apprehension of the chilling effects on Internet expression 
that may accompany the imposition of a federally mandated crimi-
nal law.113 In other words, opponents worry about the First Amend-
ment free speech ramifications of limiting the freedom to distribute 
content online without the fear of punishment by the government.114 
In order for a law to pass strict constitutional scrutiny under the First 
Amendment Free Speech Clause, the law must be narrowly tailored 
and enacted in order to achieve a compelling governmental inter-
est.115 Generally, adult pornography is considered protected speech 
under a free speech analysis; however, the nonconsensual aspect of 
revenge porn may tip the scales in favor of criminalization when 
                                                                                                         
hundreds of things working against an individual working to remove a specific 
piece of content from the internet . . . . It’s almost impossible.” Id. 
 112  See Larkin, supra note 58, at 97, 97 n.151. 
 113  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1294–95; see Erin 
Fuchs, Here’s What the Constitution Says About Posting Naked Pictures of Your 
Ex to the Internet, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2013, 1:08 PM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/is-revenge-porn-protected-by-the-first-amendment-2013-9. 
 114  The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 115  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
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weighing the speech’s harms against its societal free speech 
value.116 
Many proponents of the criminalization of nonconsensual por-
nography argue for various strategies to ensure that revenge porn 
laws are not stamped out by First Amendment concerns, including 
as an already-established category of unprotected speech, such as 
defamation or obscenity,117 or, alternatively, as a new category of 
unprotected speech warranting regulation.118 Most opponents who 
are wary that the criminalization of nonconsensual pornography 
triggers First Amendment concerns argue that laws prohibiting this 
conduct are effectively content- or viewpoint-based speech laws, 
and thus, should not be constitutionally upheld.119 Content- or view-
point-based restrictions prohibiting certain forms of speech—“in-
cluding speech intended to annoy, harass, or cause emotional dis-
tress”—will typically be deemed unconstitutional.120 However, ad-
vocates rebut this claim by emphasizing that revenge porn laws are 
not attempting to restrict the content of expression—i.e., intimate 
images or videos—but rather, are merely attempting to place rea-
sonable restrictions on the “time, place, or manner” of the speech—
i.e., that it be consensually distributed.121 This highlights the im-
portant absence of any “intent to harm” requirement in the proposed 
IPPA bill.  
Statutes that criminalize nonconsensual pornography, which fo-
cus on harassment, annoyance, or emotional distress, arguably raise 
First Amendment free speech concerns, as the Supreme Court has 
persistently held that the offensiveness of speech does not constitute 
a sufficiently compelling government interest to justify government 
intrusion into individual expression.122 Other critics highlight that 
                                                                                                         
 116  Cohen, supra note 12, at 331–32.  
 117  See Kitchen, supra note 75, at 255–56, 276–80. 
 118  See Cohen, supra note 12, at 331–46; Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, 
supra note 11, at 1317. 
 119  See Kitchen, supra note 75, at 274. 
 120  Id. 
 121  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1317–18. 
 122  See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988) (high-
lighting the “longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the 
speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience”); FCC 
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (“[T]he fact that society may find 
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the 
speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it 
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these harms do not serve compelling government interests for the 
same reasons.123 Furthermore, these intent to harm requirements ar-
guably transform otherwise constitutional, content-neutral, “time, 
place, and manner restrictions” into viewpoint-based restrictions, 
hence, causing more constitutional infirmity than assistance. 124 
Therefore, requiring intent to harm elements into laws prohibiting 
nonconsensual pornography may ironically pose the very problems 
they are purportedly intended to attenuate.  
Other critics of the IPPA point to the potential chilling effects 
on internet intermediaries as defined in section 230 of the Commu-
nications Decency Act and express concern that these internet inter-
mediaries, such as Facebook and Google—which already handle an 
extraordinary amount of content provided by others—would find 
themselves ensnared in an over-burdensome regulatory system and 
potentially facing liability for these images.125 However, in an effort 
to assuage these concerns, the IPPA bill proposes differing standards 
of liability for individuals and for these telecommunication interme-
diaries.126 The differing standards derive from the mens rea neces-
sary for criminal liability under the IPPA: “Individuals should be 
liable when they knowingly disclose private, sexually explicit mate-
rial with reckless disregard as to whether the disclosure was consen-
sual, but telecommunication providers should only be liable when 
                                                                                                         
constitutional protection.”); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is 
firmly settled that . . . the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely 
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”). 
 123  See John A. Humbach, Privacy and the Right of Free Expression, 11 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 16, 30–38 (2012) [hereinafter Humbach, Privacy].  
 124  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1318 (“Consensu-
ally distributed images do not differ in content or message from images distributed 
without consent. The [IPPA] does not favor some types of sexually explicit con-
tent over others or require that sexually explicit material promote a certain mes-
sage. Nonconsensual pornography laws based on my model statute [such as the 
IPPA] restrict no message, only the manner of distribution. The governmental 
purpose is to protect privacy, not to express disapproval or suppress unfavorable 
viewpoints.”); see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (holding that 
although the government may not regulate the content of speech, it may place 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech). 
 125  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1294–95.  
 126  See Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. 
(2016). 
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they actively and knowingly engage in the distribution of noncon-
sensual pornography.” 127  Therefore, intermediaries who act in 
“good faith,” and do not “intentionally promote or solicit content 
that they know to be in violation of the statute” are shielded from 
liability.128 
Despite these criticisms, civil liberties groups, criminal law 
practitioners, and constitutional scholars praised the IPPA as being 
narrow enough to constitutionally satisfy First Amendment require-
ments while allowing enough breadth to provide ample protection 
to victims of nonconsensual pornography.129  However, there are 
certain civil liberties groups—most notably, the ACLU—that still 
actively oppose the IPPA’s, and other similar state laws’, regula-
tions criminalizing the distribution of nonconsensual pornography 
as enacted.130  
b. Over-Breadth & Overcriminalization 
Similar to the apprehension that telecommunication intermedi-
aries would be too easily ensnared by liability, another oft-cited 
ground critics of the criminalization of nonconsensual pornography 
rely upon is the notion that laws of this nature would only perpetuate 
the criminal justice system’s overcriminalization and mass incarcer-
ation epidemic.131 Opponents likewise express concern regarding 
revenge porn prohibitions appearing overbroad and/or creating un-
constitutional void-for-vagueness issues.132  
                                                                                                         
 127  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1295 (emphasis added). 
 128  Id. at 1295–96 (“This solution, developed through intensive consultation 
with members of the tech industry, effectively reinstates Section 230 immunity 
for intermediaries that act in good faith.”). 
 129  Franks, It’s Time, supra note 8. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, one of the 
nation’s most influential constitutional scholars, stated, “There is no First Amend-
ment problem with this bill. The First Amendment does not protect a right to in-
vade a person’s privacy by publicizing, without consent, nude photographs or vid-
eos of sexual activity.” Press Release, Jackie Speier, supra note 87. 
 130  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1327–35. 
 131  See id. at 1302–08; see also George Will, America Desperately Needs to 
Fix Its Overcriminalization Problem, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 9, 2015, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/04/america-desperately-needs-fix-its-
overcriminalization-problem-george-will/. 
 132  See Larkin, supra note 58, at 97 n.151.  
2019] THE PRIVACY HIERARCHY 595 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine turns on the concept of “uncon-
stitutional uncertainty”133 and derives from the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, requiring criminal laws to 
be drafted with sufficient clarity to put a reasonable person of ordi-
nary intelligence on notice that his or her conduct would be consid-
ered criminal.134 To avoid void-for-vagueness issues, laws prohibit-
ing nonconsensual pornography must be drafted narrowly enough to 
avoid the pitfalls of unconstitutional uncertainty and overcriminali-
zation.135 One legal scholar suggested that “a suitably clear and nar-
row statute banning nonconsensual posting of nude pictures of an-
other, in a context where there’s good reason to think that the subject 
did not consent to publication” would be constitutional.136 
For example, laws that do not require the subject or victim to be 
identified or, at the very least, identifiable,137 may be considered im-
permissibly broad and/or void-for-vagueness.138 Critics may argue 
that by not requiring the subject to be identified or identifiable, the 
law may be unconstitutionally “criminalizing a victimless act,” es-
pecially as most of the harms associated with nonconsensual por-
nography stem predominantly from the fact that others are aware of 
the subject’s identity.139 Another example of a law that may fall 
                                                                                                         
 133  See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. 
PA. L. REV. 67, 67–69 (1960). It is also important to note that the doctrines of 
overbreadth or overcriminalization and void-for-vagueness are not to be con-
flated. Nonetheless, overly vague statutes may have the added effect of over-crim-
inalization. 
 134  See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of 
Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 760–61 (2012). For a discus-
sion on the development of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in the United States 
Supreme Court precedent, see Note, supra note 133. 
 135  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1290–91.  
 136  Emily Bazelon, Why Do We Tolerate Revenge Porn?, SLATE (Sept. 25, 
2013, 6:21 PM), www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/09/revenge_ 
porn_legislation_a_new_bill_in_california_doesn_t_go_far_enough.html (quot-
ing Eugene Volokh). 
 137  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90(b) (2018); IDAHO CODE § 18-6609 
(2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b-203(2) (2018), https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Ti-
tle76/Chapter5b/C76-5b-S203_2014040320140513.pdf. For examples of state 
laws that explicitly require identification, see, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1425(A) (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2018); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-7-107(1) (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1110.9(1)(b) (2018). 
 138  See Kitchen, supra note 75, at 268. 
 139  See id.  
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within the unconstitutional purview of being deemed overbroad is 
one that “include[s] expansive definitions of nudity,” or one that just 
simply does not clearly define what would constitute nudity under 
the statute.140 Over-expansive definitions may unintentionally crim-
inalize innocuous behavior, justifying concerns of overcriminaliza-
tion and void-for-vagueness.141  
However, the IPPA seems to avoid these pitfalls by requiring 
that the subject be identified or identifiable, by clearly defining its 
elements, such as nudity and consent, and by providing for numer-
ous exceptions, including distribution for law enforcement pur-
poses, voluntary exposure, and depictions that are in the bona fide 
public interest.142 
Despite the IPPA’s victories in terms of effective legislative 
drafting, staunch critics still steadfastly oppose the IPPA’s, and sim-
ilar state laws’, enactment without the addition of even narrower 
guidelines.143 For example, in May 2014, Arizona enacted its first 
criminal nonconsensual pornography law;144 however, in September 
of that same year, the ACLU filed suit against the state, challenging 
the law as unconstitutionally overbroad.145 Representing “[a] broad 
coalition of bookstores, newspapers, photographers, publishers, and 
librarians,”146 the ACLU insisted the statute be redefined as follows: 
                                                                                                         
 140  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1290. Georgia, for ex-
ample, defines “nudity” as 
(A) The showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic 
area, or buttocks without any covering or with less than a full 
opaque covering; (B) The showing of the female breasts with-
out any covering or with less than a full opaque covering; or (C) 
The depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid 
state.  
§ 16-11-90(a)(2). 
 141  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1290.  
 142  See Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th Cong. 
(2016). 
 143  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1327–30.  
 144  Michelle Dean, Arizona Adds Revenge Porn Law to Its Books, GAWKER 
(May 2, 2014, 9:17 AM), http://gawker.com/arizona-adds-revenge-porn-law-to-
its-books-1570757305.  
 145  Press Release, ACLU, First Amendment Lawsuit Challenges Ariz. Crimi-
nal Law Banning Nude Images (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/news/first-
amendment-lawsuit-challenges-arizona-criminal-law-banning-nude-images.  
 146  Id.  
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(1) a person who was or is in an intimate relationship 
with another person and who, (2) during and as a re-
sult of that relationship, obtained a recognizable im-
age of such other person in a state of nudity, (3) 
where such other person had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and an understanding that such image 
would remain private, (4) to display such image (5) 
without the consent of such other person, (6) with the 
intent to harass, humiliate, embarrass, or otherwise 
harm such other person, and (7) where there is no 
public or newsworthy purpose for the display.147  
Though the court never decided the constitutionality of the pro-
posed bill, Arizona lawmakers ultimately buckled and agreed to in-
clude an “intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce the 
depicted person” requirement.148 Heartened by this seeming “vic-
tory,”149 the ACLU continued to insist upon an “intent to harm” re-
quirement and succeeded in assisting numerous state legislatures in 
adjusting their proposed revenge porn bills to the ACLU’s proposed 
specifications above.150 
                                                                                                         
 147  Letter from ACLU Found. of Ariz., ACLU Found., and Dentons US LLP, 
to Hon. Andy Briggs, Senate President, Ariz. State Senate, Hon. Andy Tobin, 
Speaker of the House, Ariz. House of Rep., and Hon. Mark Brnovich, Att’y Gen. 
of the State of Ariz., at 2 (Jan. 7, 2015), https://drive.google.com/file 
/d/0B2LoKN1jK5BNX0NsZUdOUng5ZlE/view?usp=sharing.  
 148  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A)(3) (2018).  
 149  Lee Rowland, VICTORY! Federal Judge Deep-Sixes Arizona’s Ridicu-
lously Overbroad ‘Nude Photo’ Law, ACLU (July 10, 2015), https://www.aclu 
nc.org/blog/victory-federal-judge-deep-sixes-arizona-s-ridiculously-overbroad-
nude-photo-law.  
 150  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1327. For example, the 
ACLU voiced concern over Rhode Island’s revenge porn law in 2016 because it 
did not contain an “intent to harm” requirement, which the ACLU argued made 
the law overly broad. James O’Leary, ACLU Expresses Concerns over ‘Revenge 
Porn’ Bill, WPRI (June 1, 2016, 8:12 AM), https://www.wpri.com/news/local-
news/aclu-concerned-with-revenge-porn-bill/1044409146. After much urging 
from the ACLU, Rhode Island’s governor agreed and vetoed the bill. Ted Nesi, 
Raimondo Issues First Veto, over ‘Revenge Porn,’ WPRI (June 21, 2016, 10:43 
AM), https://www.wpri.com/news/local-news/raimondo-issues-first-veto-over-
revenge-porn/1044414356. In 2018, the ACLU succeeded again when Rhode Is-
land passed its revenge porn law containing an “intent to harm” requirement. See 
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-64-3(a)(4) (2018). 
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The ACLU’s endeavor of narrowing the provisions of laws pro-
hibiting nonconsensual pornography in an attempt to limit over-
breadth—and ultimately overcriminalization—may have some 
merit, as some commentators note that “[i]nsofar as a criminal stat-
ute requires the government to prove that a person posted images 
with the intent to harass, injure, or extort the subject, the [challenged 
law] should be able to withstand [constitutional scrutiny.]”151 These 
proponents of the “intent to harm” requirement cite to the fact that 
the Supreme Court has consistently highlighted that unconstitutional 
void-for-vagueness problems can be circumvented by including 
mens rea elements in challenged criminal legislation.152 
However, this reasoning is arguably misapplied. “Intent to 
harm” requirements are not mens rea requirements, but rather mo-
tive requirements.153 As a constitutional matter, motive prerequi-
sites are not required in criminal laws.154 Moreover, aside from the 
problems posed by “intent to harm” requirements, and with regard 
to overbreadth and void-for-vagueness problems, these “intent to 
harm” requirements may again create the very infirmities they are 
purportedly established to amend.  
Laws introduced in both New York and North Carolina, with 
similar preventative measures combatting the endemic of cyberbul-
lying plaguing the Internet, were both declared unconstitutional on 
the basis that the phrases used, such as harass, torment, and humili-
ate, are unconstitutionally ambiguous, and thus, fall within the pur-
view of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.155 Vermont is the lone state 
                                                                                                         
 151  Larkin, supra note 58, at 97 n.151. 
 152  Id. (citing Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 526 
(1994); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
498–99, 499 n.14 (1982)). 
 153  See supra note 92. For example, the Model Penal Code uses only four terms 
to define mens rea: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2016). 
 154  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1289.  
 155  See David L. Hudson, Jr., Bully Fighting: New York’s High Court Says 
Anti-Cyberbullying Law Won’t Pass First Amendment Muster, A.B.A J., Nov. 
2014, at 15, 16; Eugene Volokh, Opinion, N.C. Court Strikes Down Ban on Post-
ing ‘Personal or Sexual Information’ About Minors ‘with the Intent to Torment,’ 
WASH. POST (June 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/06/11/n-c-court-strikes-down-ban-on-posting-personal-or-
sexual-information-about-minors-with-the-intent-to-torment/.  
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to have had a nonconsensual pornography law found unconstitu-
tional, though that decision was recently overturned by the Vermont 
Supreme Court in 2018.156 In fact, Vermont’s law includes such an 
“intent to harm” or motive requirement.157 In contrast, similar laws 
criminalizing nonconsensual pornography in a much more broad158 
sense, such as New Jersey’s,159 which does not contain a motive re-
quirement, have never been declared unconstitutional. Both New 
Jersey and Alaska’s160 criminal nonconsensual pornography laws 
are considered relatively broad, especially compared to what the 
ACLU would deem their quintessential revenge porn laws, and yet, 
they have withstood constitutional scrutiny for over a decade.161 
On the same note, though the ACLU has insisted that these “in-
tent to harass” or motive requirements are constitutionally necessary 
to withstand scrutiny, the civil liberties group has itself advocated 
against proposed federal harassment and stalking laws that include 
intent to cause “substantial emotional distress,” intent to “harass,” 
or intent to “intimidate” requirements as “unconstitutionally over-
broad.”162 This, however, may stem from the group’s lesser views 
of the privacy protected by nonconsensual pornography regulations 
as opposed to similar privacy laws. Alternatively, this may stem 
from an understanding that nonconsensual pornography is a form of 
harassment as opposed to a gross invasion of privacy. 
2. FORMULATING THE RIGHT: PRIVACY VS. HARASSMENT 
Revenge porn legislation must clearly define what kind of right 
the legislation aims to protect. The question worth posing is whether 
nonconsensual pornography should be deemed a form of harassment 
                                                                                                         
 156  Elizabeth Hewitt, Judge Finds ‘Revenge Porn’ Law Unconstitutional, 
VTDIGGER (Aug. 1, 2016), https://vtdigger.org/2016/08/01/judge-finds-revenge-
porn-law-unconstitutional/; Alan J. Keays, Top Court Says ‘Revenge Porn’ Law 
Constitutional; Defense Calls Ruling Bizarre,’ VTDIGGER (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://vtdigger.org/2018/08/31/top-court-says-revenge-porn-law-constitutional-
defense-calls-ruling-bizarre/.  
 157  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2605 (2018).  
 158  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1330. 
 159  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2018). 
 160  ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120 (2018). 
 161  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1330. 
 162  See, e.g., Gabe Rottman, New Expansion of Stalking Law Poses First 
Amendment Concerns, ACLU (Mar. 12, 2013, 1:55 PM), https://www.aclu.org/ 
blog/free-speech/new-expansion-stalking-law-poses-first-amendment-concerns.  
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or an invasion of privacy.163 Though precedent establishes that both 
types of social harms are worthy of legislative protection, numerous 
reasons exist as to why nonconsensual pornography may not—and 
should not—fit into the category of anti-harassment regulations.164 
Several advocates express the belief that New Jersey’s compre-
hensive revenge porn law—though not initially intended as such—
rightfully conveys “the idea that the exposure of [the victim’s] ‘in-
timate parts’ or ‘sexual contacts’ is inherently intrusive.”165 Thus, 
advocates view it as a “prime example” of how to characterize and 
criminalize the harms created by nonconsensual pornography, pri-
marily as a privacy right rather than a protection against harass-
ment.166  
Requiring “intent to harm,” “intent to harass,” or other similar 
motive elements in the IPPA, or similar state laws, effectively trans-
forms a privacy protection regulation into an anti-harassment regu-
lation.167  This may be considered a gross mischaracterization of 
what the pertinent social harms arising from nonconsensual pornog-
raphy actually are—nonconsensual pornography may sometimes in-
volve harassment, but “[w]hat nonconsensual pornography always 
involves is an invasion of privacy, and the harm it always inflicts is 
a loss of privacy.”168 By demoting the focused harm from a gross 
invasion of privacy to a form of harassment, the legislation will fail 
to capture the actual harms nonconsensual pornography poses.169 
This is likely the result of a privacy hierarchy. 
It has been widely established that the Constitution encompasses 
a right to privacy that extends beyond the reach of both governmen-
tal intrusion and unreasonable private intrusion.170 In fact, the Su-
                                                                                                         
 163  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1330–33. 
 164  See supra Part I.  
 165  Kitchen, supra note 75, at 267 (quoting Andrew Gilden, Cyberbullying and 
the Innocence Narrative, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 357, 383–84 (2013)). 
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 167  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1330–31 (arguing that 
“[t]reating nonconsensual pornography as harassment would merely duplicate ex-
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 168  Id. at 1283 (emphasis omitted).  
 169  Id. at 1330–31, 1333. 
 170  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
[constitutional] protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
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preme Court has upheld a right to sexual privacy under the substan-
tive component of the Due Process Clauses on numerous oc-
cassions.171 Furthermore, the IPPA would not be the first federal 
regulation criminalizing the dissemination of private information, 
and the criminalization of gross invasions of privacy—such as the 
Privacy Act of 1974172—has been consistently upheld by our state 
and federal legislative and judicial systems.173 Other similar crimi-
nal laws upheld—and also endorsed by the ACLU as protections 
against privacy invasions—include the prohibition against uncon-
                                                                                                         
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”) (internal cita-
tions omitted).  
 171  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (holding 
that forbidding the use of contraceptives violated the constitutional guarantee of 
the right of marital privacy that is “older than the Bill of Rights—older than our 
political parties, older than our school system”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453–55 (1972) (finding that “whatever the rights of the individual to access to 
contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the mar-
ried alike,” thus “dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are 
similarly situated violate[s] the Equal Protection Clause”); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 576–79 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their 
private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without inter-
vention of the government.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 
(2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the 
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that 
liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental 
right to marry.”). 
 172  Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)) (making it unlawful for federal agencies to 
disclose personal identifiers, such as name or social security number, without con-
sent unless certain exceptions apply).  
 173  See, e.g., Social Security Numbers (H 5202, S 179), ACLU R.I. (Feb. 8, 
2011), http://riaclu.org/legislation/bill/social-security-numbers-h-5202-s-179/ 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2019).  
602 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:569 
sented disclosure of personal information such as medical rec-
ords, 174  cell phone information, 175  and other financial infor-
mation,176 none of which have an “intent to harm” element as a req-
uisite for criminal liability.177  
Many of these scenarios include a similar notion of contextual 
consent present in a situation involving nonconsensual pornogra-
phy. For example, an individual may consent to giving his or her 
social security number or health information under the premise that 
the information will not be distributed for any purpose other than 
that intended in that transactional or intimate relationship.178 This 
protection against invasions of privacy, even paired with contextual 
consent, has been clearly upheld as warranted by the legislature and 
judicial system. Deciding exactly what kind of privacy warrants this 
protection, however, creates some push back.  
III. THE GEOLOCATIONAL PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE ACT 
A similar example of a proposed law prohibiting the nonconsen-
sual disclosure of personal information is the GPS Act, which, if 
enacted, would make it a criminal offense to intentionally sell or 
distribute an individual’s geolocational records without his or her 
consent.179 The GPS Act defines “geolocation information” as 
any information that is not the content of a commu-
nication, concerning the location of a wireless com-
munication device or tracking device . . . that, in 
whole or in part, is generated by or derived from the 
                                                                                                         
 174  42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).  
 175  47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).  
 176  12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012). 
 177  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1332–33. 
 178  See Cohen, supra note 12, at 332–34 (describing how initial consent does 
not insulate an individual from liability when he or she knowingly distributes or 
publishes images or information, for consent is “context-specific”). 
 179  See Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 1062, 115th Cong. 
(2017). Though the statute provides for additional exceptions where consent is not 
a factor, such as a warrant exception, these exceptions do not pertain to the dis-
cussion in this Note. 
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operation of that device and that could be used to de-
termine or infer information regarding the location of 
the person.180 
Introduced in February 2017 by a bipartisan group of Congres-
sional members, the GPS Act was “[d]esigned to enact comprehen-
sive rules for both government agencies and commercial service 
providers” and “would require law enforcement to obtain a warrant 
before using GPS data to track an individual’s location.”181 Though 
the main aspect of the proposed bill is to create guidelines for law 
enforcement in obtaining personal geolocation information, the bill 
likewise prohibits, with risk of criminal liability, “commercial ser-
vice providers from sharing customers’ geolocation information 
with outside entities without customer consent.”182 The bulk of this 
comparative analysis will derive from this non-law enforcement as-
pect of the GPS Act. 
The proposed impact of the GPS Act on private companies will 
be to provide a “strong legal framework” governing access to cus-
tomers’ geolocation information and to create guidelines to ensure 
these providers are able to comply with the “unclear and potentially 
conflicting obligations” between government and private entity re-
quests and customer privacy protection.183 The GPS Act likewise 
applies to private entities and persons who illegally and intentionally 
obtain or disseminate an individual’s geolocation information.184 
The GPS Act protects “both real-time tracking and access to records 
of individuals’ past movements.”185 However, “[t]he GPS Act per-
mits service providers to collect geolocation information in the nor-
mal course of business,” such as through smartphone applications, 
                                                                                                         
 180  Id. § 2. 
 181  Kapoor & Archer, supra note 8.  
 182  Press Release, Ron Wyden, Sen., Wyden, Chaffetz, Conyers Bill to Crack 




 183  GPS Act, RON WYDEN U.S. SEN. FOR OR., https://www.wyden.sen-
ate.gov/priorities/gps-act (last visited Jan. 5, 2019). 
 184  Id.  
 185  Id.  
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given that the customer has consented to such use.186 The bill, how-
ever, clarifies that “these companies are only allowed to share or sell 
customers’ data with the consent of individual customers.”187  
In a recent press release addressing the bill, Representative Jason 
Chaffetz explained, “Congress has an obligation to act quickly to 
protect Americans from violations of their privacy made possible by 
emerging technologies.”188  Representative John Conyers, Jr., an-
other proponent of the bill, stated that geolocation information 
“strikes at the heart of personal privacy interests,” and thus, calls for 
immediate protective action by the legislature.189 Neema Singh Gu-
liana, legislative counsel for the ACLU, stated, “Congress should 
swiftly pass the GPS Act to protect this sensitive information.”190 
A. Current Geolocation Protection Laws 
Similar to legislation proposed and enacted to combat noncon-
sensual pornography, most of the current legislation regarding geo-
location protection did not exist until the recent technological boom, 
and yet still was considerably delayed in its proliferation until the 
widespread use of smartphones.191 The legal jurisprudence of geo-
location protection differs throughout the country, with some states 
depending on judicial rulings to create precedent, while others have 
enacted express legislation addressing the issue. 192  However, 
though state legislatures and lower state courts have expanded loca-
tion privacy protections as of late, these protections differ based on 
what state an individual is located in, and can even differ based on 
what jurisdiction of law enforcement—federal versus local or state 
                                                                                                         
 186  Id.  
 187  Id.  
 188  Press Release, Ron Wyden, supra note 182. 
 189  Id.  
 190  Id.  
 191  See Kapoor & Archer, supra note 8 (“Existing law applicable to the access 
and use of geolocation data has not kept pace with developments in technol-
ogy . . . .”); see also Peter Cihon, Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the 
States: 2015, ACLU (Aug. 26, 2015, 1:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/pri-
vacy-technology/location-tracking/status-location-privacy-legislation-states-
2015. 
 192  See Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking/cell-phone-lo-
cation-tracking-laws-state (last visited Jan. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Tracking 
Laws].  
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law enforcement—is seeking the information.193 Thus, the GPS Act 
was introduced to address these inconsistencies.194  
For example, Montana’s legislation requires a warrant for all cell 
phone location information, but does not restrict federal law en-
forcement.195 The Florida Supreme Court held that a warrant is re-
quired for real-time location tracking.196 However, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that no warrant was required for histori-
cal location information.197 In Colorado, state law requires a warrant 
for access to location information directly from devices, but not 
from service providers.198 Contrastingly—and not uncommonly—
New York does not have any binding authority regarding geoloca-
tion information protection; thus, this information remains “unpro-
tected.”199 In sum, “courts have created differing standards on what 
procedures must be followed for government agencies to obtain ge-
olocation data from commercial service providers, thereby creating 
conflicting obligations across jurisdictions.”200 
As a result, the GPS Act was introduced in an endeavor to rec-
oncile these discrepancies, and to create federally endorsed guide-
lines for the proper use and disclosure of individuals’ private loca-
tion information.201 What most, if not all, of this jurisprudence—
both legislative and judicial—lacks, however, is a criminal prohibi-
tion against the distribution of an individual’s geolocation infor-
mation;202 therefore, the GPS Act would effectively be the first ge-
olocation protection law of its kind to enact criminal sanctions 
against private entities.203 
                                                                                                         
 193  See id.  
 194  See Kapoor & Archer, supra note 8. 
 195  MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-110 (2017). 
 196  See Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 525–26 (Fla. 2014). 
 197  United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 198  COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-303.5 (2018). 
 199  Tracking Laws, supra note 192.  
 200  Kapoor & Archer, supra note 8. 
 201  See Press Release, Ron Wyden, supra note 182.  
 202  Cf. Tracking Laws, supra note 192 (noting the cell phone location tracking 
laws by state).  
 203  See Press Release, Ron Wyden, supra note 182. 
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B. Legal Implications of Geolocation Protection Laws 
Geolocation protection laws have been introduced and enacted 
as a means of ensuring individuals’ rights to their constitutional pro-
tection against unlawful searches and seizures.204 The ultimate goal 
of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the people’s right to privacy 
and unreasonable invasions by the government;205 therefore, a war-
rant is typically required in order to access an individual’s property, 
person, or effects.206 According to advocates of the GPS Act, pri-
vacy laws have not kept pace with the ever-advancing technologies 
of the digital age, which is reason for the widespread support for the 
bill’s enactment.207 However, some noted that the GPS Act may 
pose similar legal implications to those of the IPPA, such as over-
breadth and vagueness issues.208  
For example, one commentator noted that though “[t]he bill’s 
warrant requirement has been well-received by privacy advocates,” 
it may contain some definitional ambiguities that could render the 
law unconstitutionally void-for-vagueness.209 Though the definition 
of “geolocation information” is defined in the bill as information 
that is not the content of a communication, and could be used to 
determine or infer an individual’s location, “[t]his definition is ar-
guably broad enough to include IP addresses.”210 This could simi-
larly lead to overcriminalization concerns as well as the criminali-
zation of innocuous behavior, as geolocation information may be 
                                                                                                         
 204  See Cihon, supra note 191. 
 205  Camara v. Mun. Court of the City and Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 
(1967) (“The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in count-
less decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”). 
 206  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”).  
 207  See Press Release, Ron Wyden, supra note 182; Kapoor & Archer, supra 
note 8. 
 208  See The Next Privacy Frontier: Geolocation, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PRO-
FESSIONALS (June 3, 2013), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-next-privacy-frontier-ge-
olocation.  
 209  Id. 
 210  Id.; see Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, H.R. 1062, 115th 
Cong. (2017). 
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obtained through many differing means, such as GPS-based loca-
tion, Wi-Fi signal strength, and IP addresses.211  
Furthermore, though the criminal sanction pertaining to the dis-
tribution of an individual’s geolocation information turns entirely on 
consent, the proposed bill does not clearly identify what form of 
“prior consent” suffices to fall within the bill’s exception.212 Failing 
to specify what would constitute adequate consent for a criminal 
sanction that requires a primary element of the crime to be “noncon-
sensual” arguably fails to put an individual of ordinary knowledge 
on notice regarding his or her conduct, and thus, would be deemed 
unconstitutionally void-for-vagueness as a violation of due pro-
cess.213 
IV. RECONCILING THE TWO POTENTIAL FEDERAL LAWS 
Though both proposed laws are not analytically identical, both 
bills, if enacted, would guarantee federal criminal protections 
against gross invasions of individual privacy. Both bills would crim-
inally prohibit the distribution or dissemination of an individual’s 
private information. Both bills are proposed to combat a multitude 
of violations made possible by the digital age. The criminality of 
both bills turns on the element of consent. Contextual consent. Why 
then has one bill seemed to garner more support and far less criti-
cism than the other? The answer may lie in both legal and societal 
justifications behind privacy protections, suggesting that some 
forms of privacy warrant more protection than others—a privacy hi-
erarchy.214 
Each of the proposed bills consists considerably of the same 
criminal elements and mens rea requirements: (1) the intentional 
disclosure of (2) a person’s private information (3) without con-
sent.215 However, the mens rea required by the IPPA regarding con-
sent involves “reckless disregard for the person’s lack of consent to 
                                                                                                         
 211  Id.  
 212  Id.; see H.R. 1062.  
 213  See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 214  However, the notion that certain forms of privacy are deserving of more 
protection than others is not a new concept by any means. See supra note 171.  
 215  See H.R. 1062; Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 5896, 114th 
Cong. (2016).  
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the distribution.”216 On the other hand, the GPS Act requires “know-
ing or having reason to know that the information was obtained” 
without consent or in violation of the Act.217 Despite these similari-
ties, neither bill contains a motive or intent to harm requirement, 
such as those suggested by critics of the IPPA.218 In fact, there seems 
to be a lack of opposition calling for such a requirement for the GPS 
Act.219  
While there are similarities in the criminal elements and mens 
rea requirements of both bills, the kinds of privacy involved in each 
bill differ entirely. The GPS Act involves location information, 
while the IPPA involves intimate and sexual information about an 
individual. Nevertheless, both scenarios involve the concept of con-
textual consent. With regard to geolocation information, a customer 
may consensually give this information to a service provider by us-
ing, for example, their iPhone’s GPS function, or by turning on their 
WiFi publicly, or simply by allowing their smartphone applications 
to track their whereabouts for better quality service. This consent is 
usually given with the implicit understanding that this information 
will not be distributed or sold to third parties or government entities 
for tracking purposes. The intimate pictures or videos protected by 
the IPPA are likewise typically given with an implicit understanding 
that this consent is bound by the context of an intimate or personal 
relationship, and not for the further dissemination of said infor-
mation.220 These differing forms of privacy, however, pose varying 
legal and societal implications. 
A. A Legal Analysis 
From a purely legal perspective, there is a relatively simple re-
sponse to this incongruity in support between the two bills: the GPS 
Act is proposed to protect an expressed privacy right against unrea-
                                                                                                         
 216  H.R. 5896.  
 217  H.R. 1062.  
 218  See supra Section II.B.1.b; see also infra Section IV.A. 
 219  See Fulton, supra note 10 (noting support for the 2013 GPS Act). 
 220  See Cohen, supra note 12, at 332–34 (describing how “[c]onsenting to one 
is not consenting to all”).  
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sonable search and seizures explicitly stated in the Fourth Amend-
ment.221 In contrast, there is arguably no explicit right of protection 
against the dissemination of one’s naked pictures as advocates of the 
IPPA would hope.222  This position was bolstered by the United 
States Supreme Court’s relatively recent holding in United States v. 
Jones, where the Court held that location tracking by law enforce-
ment does in fact implicate the Fourth Amendment.223 Explaining 
how intimate geolocation data can be, Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
stated 
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive 
record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, profes-
sional, religious, and sexual associations. . . . 
Awareness that the Government may be watch-
ing chills associational and expressive freedoms. 
                                                                                                         
 221  Kate Tummarello, Congress Must Protect American’s Location Privacy, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deep 
links/2017/02/congress-must-protect-americans-location-privacy. 
 222  See Fuchs, supra note 113 (noting that “[r]evenge porn could be held up as 
another exception [to free speech], since it obviously wasn’t considered by the 
authors of America’s Constitution”). However, this privacy may be found in the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clauses, as discussed above. See supra 
note 171. 
 223  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). Even more recently, the 
Supreme Court extended this Fourth Amendment protection to carrier cell-site 
records that reveal a phone’s location. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2217 (2018). Relying largely on the same privacy premises of Justice So-
tomayor’s concurrence, infra note 219, the Court noted that “[g]iven the unique 
nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a 
third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment 
protection.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. Quoting its rationale from Katz v. 
United States, the Court likewise highlighted that “what [one] seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected.” Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). Further 
pointing to the “revealing nature” of a phone’s locational data, the Court dis-
missed the argument that the sole act of sharing the information completely di-
minishes one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in such intimate information. 
Id. at 2219–20. As discussed further in this Note, these arguments can and should 
likewise be utilized in upholding legislation enacted to criminalize nonconsensual 
pornography.  
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And the Government’s unrestrained power to assem-
ble data that reveal private aspects of identity is sus-
ceptible to abuse.224 
Though the focus of the GPS Act’s criminal sanction against 
nonconsensual distribution of geolocation information is aimed at 
private entities, particularly commercial service providers,225 this 
provision is likely utilized as an added safeguard to the bill’s general 
bulwark protecting the foundational right of privacy against the gov-
ernment encompassed in the Fourth Amendment.  
Thus, on its face, the focus of the GPS Act is to protect individ-
uals against government intrusions, while the IPPA protects against 
private intrusions. This likely plays a large part behind the differ-
ence in support, as this country was founded on the general principle 
of governmental distrust and suspicion.226 This systemic distrust of 
the government serves as a beneficial check on government excesses 
and oversteps.227 Thus, citizens and their respective legislative rep-
resentatives may be more inclined to support and uphold laws, such 
as the GPS Act, that function as a check against governmental abuse 
of power, even if that means limiting the rights of private entities.228 
Nonetheless, the GPS Act, despite its facially justified check on gov-
ernmental intrusions, does in fact include private intrusions, and the 
legislation must withstand scrutiny in its entirety, not simply in its 
more amenable applications.  
                                                                                                         
 224  Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 225  Press Release, Ron Wyden, supra note 182. 
 226  See Lynn Vavreck, The Long Decline of Trust in Government, and Why 
That Can Be Patriotic, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (July 3, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/07/04/upshot/the-long-decline-of-trust-in-government-and-
why-that-can-be-patriotic.html (“Questioning the aims and efforts of [the] gov-
ernment is a foundation of American citizenship. It’s how the nation was born.”).  
 227  See, e.g., Ari Shapiro, Distrusting Government: As American As Apple Pie, 
NPR (Apr. 9, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=126028106. For an overview on trends in government distrust, 
see Trust in Government: The Season of Discontent, NPR, https://www.npr.org/ 
series/126051549/trust-in-government-the-season-of-discontent (last visited Jan. 
7, 2018).  
 228  This same notion of governmental wrongs versus individual wrongs may 
serve as a basis for a societal lack of empathy for victims of nonconsensual por-
nography (or a societal empathetic view toward perpetrators of nonconsensual 
pornography). See infra Section IV.B.  
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Furthermore, notably lacking from the legal discourse regarding 
the GPS Act are any of the First Amendment concerns brought up 
in discussions about nonconsensual pornography regulations. 229 
This absence may derive from the same justifications regarding who 
the proposed bills would be regulating—in other words, the govern-
ment versus individuals. A substantial First Amendment concern 
presents itself when the speech to be regulated is individual speech; 
this may be less so when regulating the government.230 However, it 
is important to note that the GPS Act’s regulation of nonconsensual 
disclosure is in fact aimed at private entities and commercial service 
providers. But, again, since this provision is likely seen as an added 
layer of protection against government intrusion, the First Amend-
ment concerns may fall to the wayside.  
More importantly for this First Amendment comparative analy-
sis, however, is the concept of expressive versus non-expressive 
speech or activity, as well as viewpoint-based and non-viewpoint 
based speech.231 Laws that regulate conduct or speech that is con-
sidered expressive are analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard, un-
less the law is considered a content-neutral “time, place, and man-
ner” restriction, which is subject to a lesser form of scrutiny.232 
Likewise, commercial speech and incidental restraints on expressive 
conduct are subject only to intermediate scrutiny.233 The Supreme 
Court has further held that even content-based regulations may be 
valid under the First Amendment if they primarily address “harmful 
                                                                                                         
 229  See supra Section II.B.1.  
 230  See generally Humbach, Privacy, supra note 123, at 27.  
 231  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1318–24. 
 232  Id. at 1317–18. 
 233  Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial 
Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836, 2836–37 (2005) (“In 
United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court held that incidental restraints on ex-
pressive conduct are evaluated under a four-factor intermediate scrutiny test. 
Within a decade, the Court held, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., that restrictions on commercial speech are also 
subject to intermediate scrutiny. Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Court formalized its analysis of com-
mercial speech by adopting a four-factor test that closely parallels the one created 
in O’Brien.”). 
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secondary effects rather than the expressive content of particular 
conduct.”234 
Opponents of nonconsensual pornography regulations argue that 
the distribution of these illicit images is inherently expressive and 
viewpoint-based, and thus, should receive the full protection of the 
First Amendment.235 Advocates of such regulations argue that if 
these laws are to trigger First Amendment scrutiny whatsoever, they 
should be viewed as content-neutral time, place, and manner re-
strictions.236 Entire law review articles have been dedicated to de-
ciding this conflict;237 however, what matters for this analysis is that 
the “speech” involved in the GPS Act—in other words, geolocation 
information—does not seem to fall within the purview of expressive 
or viewpoint-based speech like that of the IPPA. Though advocates 
of the GPS Act emphasize how inherently personal geolocation in-
formation can be,238 it is doubtful these “chilling effects” imposed 
on commercial service providers will amount to the same magnitude 
of criticism warranting First Amendment concerns.  
On the other hand, the inherently personal attributes of geoloca-
tion information could potentially lead to the (albeit weak) argument 
that this information is expressive speech. As Justice Sotomayor and 
advocates of the GPS Act highlight, geolocation information can 
provide extremely intimate views of an individual’s livelihood, per-
haps more similar to that of nonconsensual pornography than taken 
at first glance.239 Especially for a First Amendment analysis, where 
the social value of the speech is weighed against the potential social 
                                                                                                         
 234  Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1322 (citing R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389–90 (1992) (“Another valid basis for according 
differential treatment to even a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is 
that the subclass happens to be associated with particular ‘secondary effects’ of 
the speech, so that the regulation is ‘justified without reference to the content of 
the . . . speech,’ . . . . Where the government does not target conduct on the basis 
of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because 
they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.” (emphasis omitted))). 
 235  See John A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 PACE L. 
REV. 215, 217, 235–36 (2014) [hereinafter Humbach, Constitution] (claiming that 
revenge porn laws “constitute unconstitutional content discrimination, viewpoint 
discrimination and speaker discrimination, not to mention prior restraint”).  
 236  See Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 11, at 1317–18. 
 237  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 12. 
 238  See Press Release, Ron Wyden, supra note 182. 
 239  Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16; Press Release, Ron Wyden, supra note 182. 
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harm of regulating the speech, it is curious why First Amendment 
concerns are not raised for regulations of geolocation infor-
mation. 240  As geolocation information would predominantly be 
used for law enforcement purposes,241 the social value of such in-
formation may substantially outweigh the social harm of regulating 
such speech, especially when compared to nonconsensual pornog-
raphy, which arguably retains no other purpose than to harm the vic-
tim.242 
Nonetheless, the free speech implications of the GPS Act’s reg-
ulation against the nonconsensual disclosure of an individual’s geo-
location information is outshined by its protections against unrea-
sonable government intrusions explicitly in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment—an unambiguous right that the IPPA’s protection 
against invasions of sexual privacy and individual autonomy may 
lack.  
B. A Societal Analysis 
Aside from the relevant legal reasoning behind affording each 
bill a different level of support—or lack thereof—there may also be 
supplementary societal principles causing these discrepancies. Un-
derscoring these principles is the concept of empathy and its role in 
societal, legislative, and criminal reform.  
Historically, crimes against women and young girls have been 
gravely under-criminalized.243 Nationally and internationally, there 
has been, and continues to be, a systemic failure of the world’s legal 
systems to adequately and effectively protect women from abuse of 
                                                                                                         
 240  See Cohen, supra note 12, at 311–12 (describing the balancing test used to 
determine whether speech should be protected by the First Amendment). 
 241  See Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Police Need Warrant for Cellphone Lo-
cation Data, Supreme Court Rules, WALL STREET J. (June 22, 2018, 7:18 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-supreme-court-rules-police-need-warrant-for-
most-cellphone-location-data-1529678019. 
 242  Cohen, supra note 12, at 335.  
 243  See Kim Swanson, Crime Against Women - a Brief History of Laws in the 
US, GET INCLUSIVE (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.getinclusive.com/blog/crime-
women-brief-history-laws-us. 
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all varieties.244 This has been especially true when the abuse en-
dured is of a sexual nature—physically, mentally, or emotionally.245 
With the advent of legislative reform in the United States protecting 
women’s rights, the criminal legal landscape has dramatically 
changed. Yet, our country is still plagued by a lack of recognition 
for women’s rights to sexual, physical, and expressive autonomy—
a fundamental flaw underlining the reason why there may be a soci-
etal lack of empathy for victims of nonconsensual pornography. 
The majority of victims of nonconsensual pornography are 
women.246 Despite evidence that a majority of the population may 
engage in the consensual sharing of intimate pictures or videos with 
sexual partners,247 a much greater majority of individuals use geo-
location information,248 and thus, may more readily identify with the 
harms protected by the GPS Act rather than the IPPA.249 This high-
lights the potential empathy rift in the protections imposed by the 
respective bills.  
                                                                                                         
 244  Sophie Edwards, How the Legal System Is Failing to Protect Women and 
Girls from Sexual Violence, DEVEX (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.devex.com/ 
news/how-the-legal-system-is-failing-to-protect-women-and-girls-from-sexual-
violence-89573; Swanson, supra note 236. 
 245  Edwards, supra note 244. For example, marital rape was only recently out-
lawed in all fifty states in 1993, yet some states still treat the crime as “separate” 
from other forms of sexual assault. Jennifer A. Bennice & Patricia A. Resick, 
Marital Rape: History, Research, and Practice, 4 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 
228, 231–32 (2003); Samantha Allen, Marital Rape Is Semi-legal in 8 States, 
DAILY BEAST (June 9, 2015, 5:15 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/marital-
rape-is-semi-legal-in-8-states. 
 246  CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, supra note 26, at 1; EATON ET AL., supra 
note 25, at 13. This statistic results from the self-reporting of victims of noncon-
sensual pornography; however, there may be nuances as to why this may be the 
case that this Note does not discuss or analyze. Thus, this statistic—as with all 
statistics—should be viewed contextually. This Note does not purport that men 
cannot and are not the victims of nonconsensual pornography.  
 247  See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 248  See Monica Anderson, More Americans Using Smartphones for Getting 
Directions, Streaming TV, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2016/01/29/us-smartphone-use/ (“Nine-in-ten smartphone 
owners use their phone to get directions, recommendations or other information 
related to their location, up from 74% in 2013.”). 
 249  One may also argue that there is a form of guilt associated with this sexual 
conduct that is then projected onto victims of nonconsensual pornography, creat-
ing a societal “blame the victim” mentality. 
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Victims of nonconsensual pornography are often overlooked or 
even criticized with the all too common notion that they “shouldn’t 
have taken or sent the picture.” This stigmatizing mentality is inher-
ent in what is considered “rape culture,” a culture in which prevalent 
attitudes and behaviors normalize, justify, and tolerate sexual 
crimes.250 Victims of sexual assault are likewise blamed and chas-
tised in a similar manner: “She shouldn’t have worn that skirt;” “she 
shouldn’t have gotten that drunk;” “she was too flirtatious.” These 
are paradigmatic of the “victim blaming” that acts as a form of re-
pression of women’s freedom of choice and sexual expression, and 
further highlights the lack of empathy for victims of these crimes in 
a society where we have accepted the degradation of women and 
justified sexual crimes as warranted or deserving. Victim blaming is 
parallel to a lack of empathy, and thus, it is important to recognize 
this flaw in our legal and criminal jurisprudence as an issue that must 
be addressed.251 Because many do not identify or empathize with 
victims of nonconsensual pornography, either because they are not 
a woman or because they do not engage in sending or receiving in-
timate pictures, many do not feel the urgency to protect against the 
harms created by the crime.  
In contrast, most individuals in the United States use some form 
of technology that enables geolocation information services, such as 
a smartphone, GPS device, or WiFi.252 Put frankly, everyone uses 
geolocation services, and though statistics show a majority of people 
may also engage in consensual “sexting,” individuals will feel less 
                                                                                                         
 250  Zerlina Maxwell, Opinion, Rape Culture Is Real, TIME (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://time.com/40110/rape-culture-is-real/. 
 251  This is especially important considering that only 20.6% of the 535 seats 
in Congress are held by women. Women in Congress 2018, CAWP, 
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 252  Paul Hitlin, Internet, Social Media Use and Device Ownership in U.S. 
Have Plateaued After Years of Growth, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2018), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/28/internet-social-media-use-
and-device-ownership-in-u-s-have-plateaued-after-years-of-growth/. 
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affected by a crime that has not or may not be committed against 
them, as opposed to one that they are continuously at risk of.  
There is a general discomfort with the concept of the govern-
ment, large companies, or the general public having access to one’s 
geolocation information, which is why numerous federal and state 
laws have been enacted and upheld as protections against gross in-
vasions of privacy under the Fourth Amendment and other con-
sumer protection regulations.253 However, this discomfort seems to 
lessen in relation to nonconsensual pornography, likely due to the 
general belief that a person who willingly sent intimate photographs 
expected, or should have expected, those photographs would be dis-
seminated—that they deserved it. 
Referring to the criminalization of revenge porn, former judge 
and Fox News analyst Andrew Napolitano stated, “Criminalizing 
the distribution of that which was freely given and freely received 
would be invalidated under the First Amendment.”254 However, it is 
unlikely that Judge Napolitano and other opposers would maintain 
such sentiment if the same reasoning were applied to his or her ge-
olocation information, credit card information, or social security 
numbers, all of which have likely been “freely given” in some con-
text or another. In short, empathy is the sole foundational difference 
between the two concepts and a potential explanation for the incon-
sistency in the levels of support between the GPS Act and the IPPA.  
CONCLUSION: MAKING THEM WORK 
Both the GPS Act and the IPPA strike at the very core of the 
fundamental principles of privacy inherent in American jurispru-
                                                                                                         
 253  Another potential empathy rift between the GPS Act and the IPPA involves 
the concept of punishing large corporate entities, such as commercial service pro-
viders in the GPS Act, versus punishing individuals per the IPPA. Citizens may 
feel less offended by a criminal regulation against large corporations as opposed 
to individuals because they may identify with the perpetrators of nonconsensual 
pornography. Again, this may derive from the not uncommon notion that noncon-
sensual pornography is innocent, that everyone does it, or that victims who ini-
tially consent are somehow deserving. This is not to say that every person who is 
not knowledgeable of the harms of nonconsensual pornography is a bad person or 
otherwise devious but is further reason to emphasize the need for its criminaliza-
tion. Failing to do so will further perpetuate this mentality. 
 254  Fuchs, supra note 113.  
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dence. Both criminalize the nonconsensual disclosure of an individ-
ual’s personal and intimate information, and thus, represent im-
portant values in our nation’s legal system. However, the discrepan-
cies in support of the bills have underlined somewhat of a privacy 
hierarchy, where we as a society, and Congress as our representa-
tives, favor one form of privacy over another. 
With the proper knowledge of the extent of harms addressed by 
the criminalization of nonconsensual pornography, increased sup-
port for the IPPA can and should be established. More importantly, 
however, is the need for an increase in empathy, and the understand-
ing that the privacy protected by the GPS Act is contextually the 
same as the privacy protected by the IPPA. 
With carefully tailored legislative drafting, including clear defi-
nitions of consent, both proposed bills can withstand constitutional 
scrutiny and should be upheld as archetypes of the American legal 
system’s protection against gross invasions of privacy.  
Neither form of privacy is the hierarchal superior. 
 
 
 
 
